As the EU’s Integrated Resolve 2026 exercise draws to a close, an uncomfortable question deserves attention: what happens when information travels successfully between institutions, but decisions do not?

Imagine a severe flood warning arriving at three different organisations: a municipal emergency office, an ambulance dispatch centre and a residential care facility.

The warning is accurate. The technology works. Everybody receives the information they are supposed to receive.

But the municipal office interprets it as a signal to prepare, the ambulance service is waiting for formal activation, and the care facility assumes somebody will contact them if evacuation becomes necessary.

Each organisation may be following its own procedures perfectly. Taken together, however, those procedures might produce a dangerously slow response.

This is a hypothetical situation, but it illustrates a real challenge in crisis management. Sharing information is not the same as agreeing what that information requires us to do.

And it brings us to an important European exercise taking place right now.

What is EU Integrated Resolve 2026 testing?

From 19 October to 20 November 2026, the European Union is conducting EU Integrated Resolve 2026 (EU IR26), a crisis-management exercise designed to strengthen coordination across European response mechanisms.

According to the Council of the European Union, the exercise involves complex scenarios of a hybrid nature, with potential crises unfolding both inside and outside the EU.

This work forms part of Europe’s broader effort to improve preparedness and resilience. The threats are increasingly interconnected: a cyberattack can interrupt public services, an energy disruption can affect hospitals and communications, and an environmental emergency can put pressure on transport, health and local government simultaneously.

No single institution possesses everything needed to respond to such situations. Effective crisis management depends on cooperation between organisations that have different responsibilities, legal powers, resources and ways of working.

Europe has invested substantially in the systems that allow them to exchange information. The more difficult test is whether that exchange produces coordinated action when time is short and the situation is uncertain.

Why interoperability matters beyond technology

Interoperability in crisis management is the ability of different organisations and systems to exchange, understand and use information in ways that support coordinated decisions and action.

That last part matters enormously.

Two databases may exchange information without errors, but the organisations receiving it may classify the same threat differently. One agency’s warning threshold may trigger an immediate response, while another agency requires confirmation from a different authority.

The information is moving. Its meaning and consequences are not necessarily travelling with it.

We tend to describe these difficulties as technical integration problems. Sometimes they are. But frequently they also involve decisions about authority, responsibility and trust.

Who is entitled to issue an instruction? Who must approve it? Which organisation is expected to act first? What happens when two legitimate authorities disagree?

These questions cannot be answered by improving an API alone.

They require institutions to work through the less comfortable parts of cooperation: establishing shared expectations, accepting mutual dependence and agreeing what happens when ordinary procedures are no longer sufficient.

A practical test: one warning, three interpretations

There is a useful exercise that public institutions, schools, healthcare organisations and community services can adapt without needing an elaborate crisis simulation.

Take one realistic emergency scenario and identify three organisations or teams that would have to respond. Give each team only the warning and instructions it would actually receive through its normal channels.

Then ask each team to explain five things:

  1. What does this warning mean to you? Is it information to monitor, a reason to prepare or an instruction to act?
  2. What would you do first? Not what the procedure says in general, but the actual first action someone would take.
  3. Who has the authority to make that decision? Can the person receiving the warning act, or must they obtain approval?
  4. Who else needs to know? Which organisation, colleague or community group depends on your next action?
  5. What happens if the expected contact is unavailable? Is there a reliable alternative, or does the response depend on finding one particular person?

Compare the answers.

You may discover that everyone understands the scenario differently. Responsibilities might overlap, or there may be gaps that nobody has formally accepted responsibility for. The same information could produce three different timelines for action.

That is valuable evidence, particularly when it appears during an exercise rather than during a real emergency.

The purpose is not to embarrass anyone or declare the systems defective. It is to identify assumptions that have never been tested together.

Afterwards, make one change to the coordination procedure and repeat the scenario. A shared definition, a clearer decision threshold or a reliable fallback contact can sometimes make a greater practical difference than another reporting dashboard.

Preparedness must include the people making decisions

Technology is essential to modern crisis management. Early-warning systems, emergency communications, shared data platforms and geospatial information can dramatically improve our ability to recognise threats and organise responses.

But those tools operate inside institutions, and institutions are made of people.

A responder needs to trust that the information received is sufficiently reliable to act upon. A local authority needs to understand the responsibilities of the organisations around it. A healthcare manager needs to know when guidance is advisory and when it requires immediate action.

People must also have the confidence and authority to raise concerns when something does not make sense.

Consider what happens when two instructions conflict. Does the employee report the contradiction and receive a timely decision? Do they follow whichever instruction came last? Or do they quietly wait because making the wrong decision might carry greater personal consequences than making no decision at all?

An exercise that tests only whether information was transmitted may never reveal these differences.

A stronger test examines what happened after the information arrived.

This is particularly important for local organisations and civic actors. They may be closer to emerging problems, understand community needs and recognise consequences that are not immediately visible to national coordination structures.

Their knowledge should not have to travel through a maze of informal personal contacts before somebody considers it relevant.

Europe’s next challenge is making coordination work under pressure

EU Integrated Resolve 2026 is an opportunity to practise and improve institutional coordination. Its value will ultimately depend on what participants learn and which improvements follow. We should not mistake the existence of an exercise for evidence of either success or failure.

But it is worth using this moment to ask a broader question.

When we assess crisis preparedness, are we measuring the availability of information, or the ability of institutions to act on it together?

A successful information exchange is necessary, but it is not the final outcome. The outcome that matters to someone waiting for medical assistance, evacuation guidance or the restoration of an essential service is whether the response arrives in time and makes sense.

At REDefine, we examine this problem as part of a wider question about how digital systems, institutional structures and human decisions shape collective resilience.

In our longer essay, Interoperability Is Political: Europe’s Hidden Vulnerability in an Age of Crisis, we explore why institutions can be technically connected yet operationally fragmented, how accountability can become obscured between systems, and why crisis preparedness depends on political choices that technology cannot make on our behalf.

The full essay is published in REDefine // Civic Intelligence on Substack as paid content.

There is one question worth taking into every future preparedness exercise, whether it involves a European institution, a municipality, a school or a community organisation:

When the warning arrives, does everyone involved know what happens next—and can they actually make it happen?